In 2006 the Israeli healthcare system faced an unprecedented outbreak of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, primarily involving KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae clonal complex CC258. This public health crisis exposed major gaps in infection control. In response, Israel established a national infection control infrastructure. The steps taken to build this infrastructure and benefits realized from its creation are described here.
In 2006 the Israeli healthcare system faced an unprecedented outbreak of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), primarily involving KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae clonal complex CC258 [1] . By the end of the first quarter of 2007, 1275 patients had CRE detected by culture (175 cases per 1 million population) [2] , and it has been estimated that more than 10 000 patients had become colonized. The widespread CRE outbreak exposed several major pitfalls in infection control (IC) in Israel and served as a catalyst for improvement. The following pitfalls were exposed: most hospitals did not have a structured IC unit; computerized databases were not widely used for infection surveillance and control; and there was no governmental body responsible for IC in healthcare facilities, allowing the pathogen to spread without a coordinated public health response. Here, we summarize how the CRE outbreak catalyzed the creation of a national infrastructure for IC, first to contain the outbreak and ultimately to improve overall performance in surveillance and control of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) and antimicrobial resistance.
THE ISRAELI HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
The population of Israel is approximately 8.7 million, with a size and density approximately those of New Jersey. Healthcare is covered via national insurance. There are approximately 15 000 acute care hospital beds in 30 public hospitals, and 25 000 long-term care beds, 15% of which are located in 15 post-acute care hospitals and the rest in some 300 other facilities. The Ministry of Health (MOH) is the licensing and regulatory body for all healthcare facilities.
INFECTION CONTROL IN ISRAEL PRIOR TO 2007
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several major hospitals in Israel established infectious diseases (ID) units, responsible for clinical consultation, judicious antibiotic use, and IC. These units were understaffed and concentrated primarily on clinical consultation and antibiotic restriction. IC was managed primarily by nurses, with a formal training curriculum established in the late 1990s. In 1981, a nosocomial infection surveillance unit was established within the MOH; the unit was involved with surgical site infection (SSI) surveillance [3, 4] but not with regulation, policymaking, or intervention. The infection surveillance activities of this unit ceased in the early 1990s. There was no organized IC activity at the MOH level, with the exception of the occasional distribution of regulatory guidelines written by ad hoc committees on subjects such as SSI prevention, cleaning and disinfection, and infectious waste disposal. During these years, a number of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), among them methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae, and MDR Acinetobacter, spread extensively in Israeli healthcare facilities, without adequate mechanisms in place for detection or response [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
In the early 2000s, 3 large tertiary care teaching hospitals independently established IC units, led by a specialist in ID with training in IC acquired abroad, and reporting directly to the hospital administration. During this period, the MOH appointed an ad hoc multidisciplinary committee to advise the director-general regarding recommended steps in IC.
The committee conducted a survey of the human resources dedicated to IC in Israeli hospitals. The survey revealed that the ratio of IC nurses to hospital beds was 1:600 and that hospital administrators were not aware of the IC physician's role. The committee issued recommendations on the structure, activity, and human resources required for IC at the hospital level and at the national level. At the hospital level, the recommendations were translated into a MOH regulatory circular issued in 2005 that dictated that in each hospital, IC activities should be led by an ID specialist with expertise in IC who is appointed by and reports directly to the hospital administration; a nurse with formal training in IC; and a clinical microbiologist. In addition, each hospital was to have a multidisciplinary IC committee that was to meet quarterly and advise the hospital director on strategy. The number of IC personnel was not stated in the circular. By the time of the 2007 CRE outbreak, only a few hospitals were in compliance with the circular. At the national level, the committee recommended that the MOH establish a national body to direct, coordinate, and regulate IC activities. This recommendation, however, was not implemented.
In parallel with these activities, in 2004-2005 Israeli hospitals were confronted with their first outbreaks of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE). An ad hoc group of IC physicians drew up guidelines for control of VRE spread. These guidelines were ultimately issued by the MOH as national requirements in 2006, creating a template for the national CRE guidelines that would be issued the following year.
THE CARBAPENEM-RESISTANT ENTEROBACTERIACEAE OUTBREAK
In February 2007, in the context of a periodic meeting of IC professionals, the nationwide scope of the CRE outbreak in Israeli hospitals first became apparent. Due to the seriousness of the perceived threat, representative IC professionals met with the director-general of the MOH to brief him on the public health crisis, advise him on the need for immediate intervention, and recommend the establishment of a professional task force to design and implement such an intervention at the national level. This advice was accepted, leading to the governmental decision to create the National Center for Infection Control (NCIC) within the MOH. This unit was given the mandate and statutory authority to solicit data and intervene as necessary within healthcare institutions to contain the spread of MDROs. Establishment of the NCIC represented a watershed moment in IC in Israel; for the first time, the state assumed overall responsibility for containment of HAIs.
The director-general of the MOH, together with the NCIC, decided that active involvement of hospital directors as well as IC professionals would be essential to containment of the CRE outbreak. An emergency meeting was convened, attended by the MOH leadership, the NCIC, and directors and professional staffs of the acute care hospitals. At this meeting, participants were briefed on the state of the outbreak and on the formation of the NCIC and the mandatory measures to be taken at each institution to contain the outbreak [2] . This sentinel event established the MOH's commitment to hospital IC and the hospital director's role as the primary responsible party for implementation of institutional IC requirements. The effect of these measures was augmented by extensive and prominent coverage of the outbreak by the mass media, which reported on the public health threat and the steps being taken by the MOH in response [10] .
From the outset, the NCIC communicated directly and frequently with hospital directors, soliciting relevant data, providing feedback on compliance and performance, and demanding corrective measures when warranted. In addition, the NCIC commenced regular site visits at each institution. The regular communication, coupled with the site visits, resulted in establishment of a standard whereby hospital management assumed responsibility and became actively engaged in IC activities at each institution. In parallel, the NCIC staff maintained intensive contact with IC professionals (physicians, nurses, and microbiologists) at each hospital and established a regular mechanism for the exchange of information and expertise.
This strategy resulted in a change of culture, wherein the hospital director and senior management are regularly involved in IC activities and responsible for their successful implementation, and the MOH senior management is made aware of required corrective measures and follows their implementation, exercising regulatory authority when necessary. In order to carry out their responsibilities, directors came to rely on effective IC units and to appreciate their importance, as it became evident that good professional guidance allowed for efficient and effective institutional implementation of IC policy requirements and achievement of targets. Root cause analysis, which requires professional expertise, was shown to be a cardinal measure in controlling the CRE outbreak. The enhanced activities of IC personnel and management's recognition of their importance, together with the increased demands imposed by the NCIC, resulted in increased allocation of resources to IC, including a tripling of the number of IC nurses and an increase in the number of positions in IC for ID-certified physicians. An additional outcome was the development of close collaborative efforts within hospitals, involving IC, clinical microbiology, logistical staffs, and medical and nursing administrations.
Management of the outbreak at the national level exposed gaps in microbiological capabilities and performance, leading to the establishment of national microbiological standards that relate to CRE diagnostics and surveillance. Properly designed and implemented surveillance for MDROs was established as a cardinal component of institutional IC activities, including outbreak control. Introduction of these standards was accompanied by education and training of microbiology personnel in the context of NCIC-initiated activities and site visits. The uniform performance demands of each laboratory required institutions to ensure that their personnel possessed the required expertise and were provided with the necessary resources. Feedback was provided to laboratory and hospital management. Laboratory performance, including screening services, rapid turnaround time, and efficient communication, was shown to correlate with overall institutional success in outbreak control. In this context, the microbiology laboratory evolved into a principal element of institutional IC. Here, too, the measures required to achieve a common goal led to the development of a professional interactive community that involves the NCIC and clinical microbiologists nationwide.
Within several months of the launch of the national CRE intervention in acute care hospitals, the NCIC extended its reach to include long-term care and community health facilities, recognizing the interdependence of the entire healthcare system in CRE control. These interventions led to a dramatic reduction in CRE incidence in both acute and post-acute care hospitals. In acute care hospitals, the incidence of CRE acquisition declined by 91% over 5 years, with an associated 3-year decline in CRE bacteremia of 29%, while the proportion of K. pneumoniae bloodstream isolates resistant to carbapenem decreased from 22% in 2007 to <4% in 2016 [11] . In post-acute care hospitals, newly detected CRE carriage decreased from 12% in 2008 to <1% in 2015 [12] .
BEYOND CRE-A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INFECTION CONTROL
Shortly after the initiation of the nationwide intervention to control the spread of CRE, the NCIC extended its activities to encompass other MDROs and HAIs. Six of these activities are described here.
Development of the statutory framework for IC activities and regulatory oversight. Upon its creation, the NCIC was charged with the statutory authority to solicit data relevant to IC, issue directives, oversee compliance, and intervene accordingly in healthcare institutions nationwide. As part of this mandate, the NCIC wrote MOH circulars, implementation of which is mandatory, on a variety of topics relevant to IC ( director, reporting directly to hospital management, and to appoint a minimum of 1 qualified IC nurse for each 200 patient beds. Laboratory, statistical, clerical, and other logistical support staff were to be provided as required. In addition, inpatient institutions and the ambulatory care sector of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) were instructed to establish IC committees with representation from the departments of management, IC, ID, nursing, microbiology, and logistics. The committees were charged with reviewing IC data and plans and advising management. Four years after the circular was issued, three-quarters of acute care hospitals nationwide had appointed a physician IC director, and half had the required number of IC nurses. Full compliance has not been achieved, due largely to budgetary limitations and a shortage of ID-trained physicians who work in the IC field. Compliance has been made a priority by the NCIC. As of 2016, the MOH provides economic incentives to hospitals that are in full compliance with IC staffing requirements. Establishment of a national program for antibiotic stewardship. In 2012, the NCIC issued a circular that defined a national program for antibiotic stewardship. The circular requires that each general hospital, post-acute care hospital, and HMO establish a stewardship committee to advise hospital management on required activities and appoint an ID-trained physician as head of the stewardship program. The ID-trained physician is responsible for creating and implementing institutional guidelines for antimicrobial use, conducting surveys and interventions, and reporting data and activities to the NCIC. Four years after the circular was issued, surveillance data regarding antibiotic use were reported by 98% of institutions, demonstrating reduction in use in the 3 sectors surveyed: acute, post-acute and ambulatory care [19] . Establishment of interministerial collaboration regarding antimicrobial use in agriculture as it pertains to human health. As part of a One Health approach, the NCIC and the Veterinary Services branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development collaborate to develop ways to minimize the negative effects of antibiotic use in agriculture on human health. Activities include collaborative research, educational initiatives, and the establishment of a national database on antibiotic use in livestock.
Key components of the Israeli infection control infrastructure at the national and institutional levels are summarized in Table 3 .
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The Israeli CRE outbreak resulted in profound changes in the national IC landscape. MDROs and HAIs are presently managed at the national level. IC units with the requisite knowledge and expertise, and with increasing levels of staffing, operate at healthcare institutions nationwide. Hospital management has become actively involved in IC. The public's and the political establishment's awareness and interest in the field have grown, expressed in a 2013 report by the state comptroller, who is charged with oversight of public institutions, and by periodic follow-up parliamentary meetings [20] . As a result of these changes, numerous successes have been achieved, including containment of the CRE outbreak [11] , a 50% reduction in central line-associated bloodstream infection rates in intensive care units (ICUs) accompanied by a marked reduction in overall ICU-acquired bloodstream infections (BSIs), successful containment of a multicenter VRE outbreak, a marked reduction in BSIs caused by MDR Acinetobacter, and reductions in antibiotic use in the inpatient and outpatient settings [19] . These results are reported in summaries issued regularly by the NCIC to hospital directors and the MOH leadership.
To date, not all IC issues have been adequately addressed by the NCIC. For example, prevention and surveillance protocols for SSIs and ventilator-associated pneumonia are still being codified as national directives, and a comprehensive, real-time national IC database is still under development. However, as the requisite national infrastructure has been established, the tools needed to carry out the tasks ahead are available.
A number of obstacles were encountered in implementing these changes. Initial pushback from some hospital administrators later gave way to close collaboration, as data generated from nationwide interventions demonstrated that compliance with national IC guidelines improved outcomes [2] . Conflicts between IC and general ID have arisen, as the field of IC evolved and gained prominence and as distinctions between IC and ID came to the forefront. The encroachment of non-IC disciplines, such as quality and safety, into areas of activity that require IC and ID knowledge and expertise made it necessary for the IC community to take a stand in order to uphold internationally recognized professional standards. In confronting these obstacles, strict adherence to professional guiding principles by the IC community and the ability to demonstrate the institutional and public health utility of abiding by IC standards enabled the NCIC to meet the challenges posed.
The Israeli model is based on a centralized IC body that serves in professional, regulatory, and interventional capacities as an arm of the MOH, working in close collaboration with institutional IC units. Our model exists in a country that is geographically small, with a limited number of healthcare facilities, all licensed and regulated by the MOH. Adoption of this model by healthcare systems outside of Israel, for example, in larger countries or those with noncentralized healthcare authorities, may impose challenges not encountered in the Israeli system. Nevertheless, we believe that the Israeli model can be successfully implemented in other healthcare systems by its application at the level of the regional public health regulatory body under the auspices of a national coordinating authority.
CONCLUSIONS
Israel has created a successful model for a national IC infrastructure. It did so in response to a potentially catastrophic public health threat. While we firmly believe in the adaptability of the Israeli model in other countries, we firmly advise that an infrastructure be created even in the absence of an outbreak, as IC challenges with widespread scope will inevitably arise. 
